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Abstract
We examine whether or not there exists a phenomenon of trust signal-
ing. First, we want to learn whether it is worthwhile for an agent to take a
potentially costly action in order to signal the trust in another agent; and
second, whether such signal of trust is then rewarded by a trust premium.
In the experiment the subjects play a modied investment game: There
are two players A and B. Player A chooses amount t from the interval
between 0 and 10 to be sent to player B. The invested amount is tripled
by the experimenter. Player B then decides whether to return a fair split,
3/2t, or a selsh split, 0, back to the player A. Half of participants play
the game sequentially, which allows trust signaling and the other half si-
multaneously. In the latter case there is no scope for B conditioning his
decision on As invested amount t.
Classication codes: C70; C91
Keywords: Experimental economics; Trust; Signaling; Guilt aversion
1 Introduction
Trust is a behavioral phenomenon present in economic and social activities. In
certain scenarios the presence of trust enables to achieve mutually better out-
comes for all participating parties through engaging in common projects, such as
trade transactions, investment, employment, relationship, marriage, or friend-
ship. In many instances trust creates conditions for a positive reciprocation of
the other party. For clarity, let us dene the trust in a way we are referring to it
in this paper by paraphrasing Cox [2000]: An agent undertakes an action that
exhibits trust if the chosen action: (a) creates a monetary gain that could be
shared with another agent; and (b) exposes him to the risk of a loss of utility if
the other agent defects and appropriates too much or all of the monetary gain.
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In economic literature the notion of trust was for the rst time explored in
an experimental setting by Berg et al. [1995]. The study investigates whether
the trust is a primitive that is present in economic behavior after eliminating
mechanisms which could sustain investment without trust, such as reputation
from repeated interactions, contractual precommitments, and potential punish-
ment threats. Berg et al. found that a signicant number of rst movers send
positive amount of money to their respective counterparts and interpret this
result as placing a trust in the belief that there would be reciprocity. A wide
body of literature replicated these results (see Fehr and Gaechter [2000] for a
survey). Cox [2004] argues that such interpretation requires all rst movers who
send positive amounts to be self-regarding. In his triadic design Cox discrim-
inates between the trust (and reciprocity) and other-regarding preferences by
comparing the behavior of subjects in the investment game with that in a spe-
cially designed dictator game. His data supports the claim that subject exert a
signicant amount of trust in the investment game scenario.
The central question we want to examine is whether or not there exists a
phenomenon of trust signaling. First, we want to learn whether it is worthwhile
for an agent to take a potentially costly action in order to signal the trust in
another agent; and second, whether such signal of trust is then rewarded by a
trust premium. Our vehicle of study is a modied investment game (Berg et
al. [1995]). We are interested whether there are systematic di¤erences between
the behavior of subjects playing the game sequentially, which allows trust sig-
naling and simultaneously where trust signaling is not possible. We modify an
investment game in the following way: There are two players A and B. Player
A decides how much to invest, i.e., she chooses amount t from the interval be-
tween 0 and 10. The invested amount is tripled by the experimenter. Player
B then decides whether to return a fair split, 3/2t, or a selsh split, 0, back
to the player A. Notice that the di¤erence between this game and the classical
investment game is that here Bs decision is binary, that is, no splits other than
fair and selsh are possible.
Behavior in the modied investment game can be described by the
guilt aversion theory (Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000]; Dufwenberg [2002]; Char-
ness and Dufwenberg [2006]; Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2005]; Battigalli and
Dufwenberg [2006], Dufwenberg et al. [2007]). The guilt aversion explanation
for why many players A in laboratory experiments send money to their anony-
mously paired counterparts is that player B would feel guilty if she returned less
(or more) than what was expected by her player A counterpart. Player A on
the other hand expects this behavior and invests. A crucial part of the theory
is that the beliefs of both players about how much should be returned upon
investment, coincide. In our scenario if the game is played sequentially player
A can signal her higher belief that player B will choose a fair split by sending a
higher t. Player B in turn understands this signal and updates her belief about
what player A expects him to do. In the sequential game this signaling and
updating the beliefs is not possible.
Our game di¤ers from the previous experimental literature on guilt aversion
in two ways. First, our main focus is on the behavior of player A in terms
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of signaling her beliefs. In contrast, Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] measure
the correlation between the outside option of player A and the amount player
A receives from B in a lost wallet game. They nd there is none. However,
their results show a positive correlation between how much player B allocates
to player A and Bs expectations of As expectation of how much B should
allocate. Charness and Dufwenberg [2006] examine the e¤ects of promises made
by player B on the decision of player A. Their game includes a chance move so
that it is not detectable whether player B defaulted on her promise or whether
it was just a bad state of the world. They nd that pre-play communication
might inuence the motivation and behavior of the subjects by a¤ecting beliefs
about beliefs. Dufwenberg et al. [2007] create an environment where subjects
can strike an informal agreement about how much should be returned upon
investment. If an agreement is made the beliefs of both players coincide. The
experimental data reveal that players A are inuenced by agreements and invest
more often, however a large fraction of players B behaves opportunistically and
defaults. Dufwenberg et al. nd that only about 1/3 of players B honor the
informal agreements.
Second, our game is di¤erent in structure. It is the player A, who has a
rich action set in comparison to rich action set of player B in experiments by
Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] and Dufwenberg et al. [2007]. Charness and
Dufwenberg [2006] use a game where choices of both players and nature are
binary.
The present paper could be considered complimentary to research by Falk
and Kosfeld [2006] on unintended signaling of distrust and its negative e¤ects
on performance. Falk and Kosfeld analyze how an agent perceives principals
decision to control. In their experimental design a principal can choose either to
trust the agent or to control him and eliminate the most opportunistic behavior.
Their results show that the principals decision to control signicantly reduces
agents willingness to act in the principals interest. Falk and Kosfeld conjecture
that the subjects interpret the control as a signal of distrust and lower their
performance. Our aim is to examine whether such a relationship is true also for
the opposite - trust signaling. Notice, that in our experiment the signal sent by
the principal is intentional, however. Falk and Kosfeld nd that most principals
do not impose a minimum e¤ort on agents but trust them to perform well on
their own. Similarly, we pose a question whether player A in the modied
investment game make use of trust signaling to achieve socially more optimal
outcomes.
Comparing the behavior of subjects playing the investment game sequen-
tially and simultaneously is somewhat similar to the hot versus cold e¤ect
of elicitation procedure in economic experiments. According to the standard
game-theoretic view the outcome of the sequential play in our setting should be
equivalent to the simultaneous play, just like the outcome of sequential play is
equivalent to the strategy method. Indeed, in reality the sequential play and
the strategy method often yield similar results (Brandts and Charness [2000],
Falk and Kosfeld [2006], and others). However, sometimes in combination with
other factors, such as context in which the game is played, the qualitative results
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can be reversed (Cox and Deck [2005] and Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher [2003])
or signicantly di¤erent (Brosig et al. [2003]). Nevertheless, if trust signaling
is behaviorally important, in the experiment we can expect higher amounts to
be both sent and returned in the treatment when investment game is played
sequentially.
To explain the di¤erences in behavior, let us consider two types of players
A in the investment game: trusting and sophisticated trusting. Trusting player
A is dened by the above denition (see the rst paragraph). She puts her
trusts in the belief that player B she is dealing with will reciprocate her trusting
action. Sophisticated trusting player A, on the other hand, also believes that
player B will reciprocate. However, sophisticated trusting player A is aware of
the positive correlation between the trust and reciprocity (testable hypothesis 1,
where both trust and reciprocity are measured in monetary transfers) and she
believes that the higher the trust the higher the reciprocity. For that reason, if
a trusting player A would exert trust t for which she would expect a return of
r(3t), the sophisticated trusting player A will exert a higher level of trust t+ a
(testable hypothesis 2) for which she expects to receive a return of r(3(t + a))
(testable hypothesis 3). The component r(3(t + a))   r(3t) is called a trust
premium.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is
presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the experimental procedures. The
early results are presented in Section 4.
2 The Model
In the general model there are two players A and B. Player A moves rst and
decides whether to send (invest) t 2 [0; 1] or not. Then, the amount is tripled
and after this B decides whether to return a fair split3=2t or a selsh split
0. Our interest is to study the behavior in two di¤erent versions of this game.
In the rst version player B does not observe t, and in the second version B
does observe t before making her choice.
Let us suppose that the player B is averse to guilt. This means that her
utility depends on what she believes player A expects her to do. If she falls short
of As expectations, i.e., she chooses the selsh split when A expected to receive
a fair amount, then she experiences a feeling of guilt which is proportional to the
the di¤erence of what was expected and what was received by A. To be a little
more precise, denote by  the belief that player A assigns to what B is going to
do, i.e.,  = Pr(fair split). And, let B be a Bs estimate of . If B chooses
a selsh split, then she disappoints A (lets A down) in the amount (3=2t) and
experiences guilt in the magnitude BB(3=2t). On the other hand, if she sends
3=2t back to A; then she avoids feeling guilty but the cost of this is 3=2t. Hence,
1 In the experimental design r corresponds to the fraction of players B who return half of
the tripled amount.
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for a given belief B ; B will choose a fair split if
BB(3=2t)  3=2t
B  1=B ;
that is, if B is su¢ ciently high. If B is low, she will keep everything. The
decision of the player A is based on her own belief, , of what B is going to do.
If   1=B and B is a correct estimate of  then A should be condent that
B will chose the fair split and hence she should send t = 1: If  < 1=B then
she should send 0.
We focus rst on what happens in the game where t is not observed. Both
players will face some uncertainty about their respective beliefs. Player B bases
her decision on her own guess of As expectations, B . On the other hand,
player As expectations, , will correspond to her own guess about what B is
planning to do2 . Each players guess is subject to her own experiences and
biases and because of this the beliefs of both players will most likely not be
identical. On average, however, they should agree. When players act optimally
subject to their own beliefs our theory predicts four di¤erent kinds of outcomes:
(t = 1; Fair split); (t = 1; Selfish split); (t = 0; Fair split); (t = 0; Selfish
split):
Next let us examine what happens when t is observed B before making her
choice. Now, player A may be able to communicatethough her action, t, how
condent she is about receiving 3=2t. Notice that given her belief, , As payo¤
is given by
(1  t+ 3=2t) + (1  )(1  t):
A quick look at this expression reveals that her payo¤ is increasing in t if
  2=3;
and it is decreasing otherwise. Hence, if A trusts B su¢ ciently to choose the fair
split, then A will maximize her payo¤ by sending t = 1 to B. On the other hand
if A is doubtful about receiving a fair share, i.e.,  < 2=3, then she should send
nothing to B. However, since t is now observable, B can use it to infer some
information about . In particular, if B observes t = 1; then she should set her
belief to B  2=3 and, vice versa, if t = 0 was observed, then Bs belief should
be B < 2=3. Next, if we assume that B is su¢ ciently high, i.e., B  3=2,
then this implies that after observing t = 1, it must be that B  3=2  1=B :
This is su¢ cient to induce B choose the fair split. But then, player A should
be condent to get the fair return after sending t = 1. As a result she will
always have an incentive to send t = 1. Thus, when t is observable, our theory
predicts a single outcome (t = 1; Fair split). In other words, player A signals
her high expectations to the player B who will then match these expectations
by choosing the fair split.
2 In an equilibrium these beliefs would have to coincide, i.e.,  = B . However, here we
are interested in an induvidual decisionmaking rather than equilibrium behavior.
5
3 Procedures
The experiment consisted of eight sessions conducted in March of 2007 at the
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. A total of [. . . ] subjects
were recruited from economics and mathematics undergraduate courses. Some
of the students had previously participated in economics experiments, but none
had experience with trust games. Each subject only participated in a single
session of the study. On average, a session lasted 60 minutes including initial
instructional period and payment of subjects. Subjects earned on average [. . . ].3
All sessions were hand run in a classroom in the Economics Department.
Each session included 22 subjects who were randomly matched into two
person groups that consisted of a player A and player B participants. The
assignment of these groups was done according to the following process. The
classroom was segmented in half such that all subjects of a given type would be
located in the same half of the room. The desks for each type were arranged
in two rows facing the wall, and thus neither type would be able to see the
other when making decisions. The subjects were free to choose any seat upon
enter the classroom. Once everyone was seated, a coin was publicly ipped to
determine which side of the room was to be which type. The allocation of a
player A and player B to a particular group was done by experimenter randomly
pairing one subject from each type together.
At no time during the experiment was there direct interaction. Each subject
was provided a set of decision sheets that were identical across subjects. Sub-
jects recorded any decisions during the experiment on these sheets. In order
to transfer information between matched pairs, the experimenters collected all
decision sheets, copied the decisions from one sheet to another, and then redis-
tributed the sheets to the subjects. This prevented the exchange of superuous
information and aided in maintaining the anonymity of individual decisions.
In order to determine the explanative power of the guilt aversion model,
we elicited subjectsbeliefs about their counterpart player prior to them playing
both trust games. The protocol used follows closely to Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000). Player A subjects were asked to predict the percentage of all player B
subjects who will transfer half in the second stage by completing the following
statement, I believe that . . . .. % of players B in the room will return HALF
of the tripled amount.Player B was asked predict what they believe to be the
average answer of player As by completing the following, I believe that the
average answer of players A was . . . .. %.The subjects earnings depended
upon the accuracy of their prediction. For this task, all subjects were endowed
with $5. For every one percentage point deviation from the actual outcome, ten
cents was deducted from the $5. Therefore, a deviation of 50% or more resulted
in zero earnings.
The general structure of the trust game is similar to Berg et al (1995). In
the rst stage of each trust game, players A were endowed with $10NZ. They had
to decide how much of this endowment they wanted to keep for themselves and
3The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was [. . . ] per
hour. Exchange rate here.
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how much to transfer to their anonymous player B counterpart. This was done
by circling one of the whole numbers ranging from zero to ten on their decision
sheet. It was common knowledge that any amount transferred by player A would
be tripled by the experimenter. That is, players B would receive three times
the amount that their player A counterpart transferred to them. In the second
stage, players B must decide how much of the tripled amount they want to keep
for themselves and how much to transfer back to their player A counterpart.
This decision is restricted to a binary choice of either half or zero. Just as for
players A, this decision was done by circling one of the two choices on their
decision sheet.
To allow us to calculate a trust premium, we conducted two versions
of the trust game di¤ering in terms of the timing of information presented to
players B. In the baseline version, the trust game is played sequentially. That is,
players B know the amount that their player A counterpart transferred to them
in the rst stage. In the second version of the trust game, the decisions by both
players are made simultaneously. Therefore, players B must decide whether
to return zero or half without knowing how much their player A counterpart
transferred to them in the rst stage. Four sessions in total will be conducted
with each version of the game.
The sequence of events in a session was the following. (1) A coin was
ipped to determine player types. (2) The instructions were read aloud for the
subjects, who followed along with their own copy. To assist in their understand-
ing, a copy of the instructions was also placed on an overhead and any decisions
sheets, tables, etc. . . were illustrated specically. The subjects were encouraged
to ask questions relating to the rules of the game at any time. (3) Both player
types completed the belief elicitation task. (4) The experimenter collected the
belief decision sheets and distributed the trust game decision sheets. (5) The
sequence of events di¤ered slightly between sessions implementing the sequential
and simultaneous trust games. In the simultaneous trust game sessions, both
player types of participants made their transfer decisions simultaneously. The
experimenter collected all decision sheets, transferred the decision information
each decision sheet to their counterparts, and returned the decision sheets to
all players to reveal their earnings. In the sequential trust game, players A rst
made their transfer decision to players B. All decision sheets were collected and
the amount transferred from players A were copied to their counterpart players
B decision sheets, which were then returned to players B. Presented with the
decision of their player A counterpart, players B made their decision on whether
to return half or zero. The experimenter collected all decision sheets, transferred
the decision information of players B to their player A counterpartsdecision
sheet, and returned the decision sheets to all players to reveal their earnings. (6)
Subjects completed a short survey on the experiment and general demographic
information for which they were paid $5 instead of a show up fee. This was not
announced to the subjects at the start of the experiment. (8) Subjects were
privately paid their earnings for the session.
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4 Results
We have completed one session of the sequential trust game to date. The seven
remaining sessions are to be completed the week of March 12-16. Obviously,
we cant say much from a single session, but the results are quite promising.
The average amount transferred from players A in the rst stage was 78% of
their endowment. Eight out of twelve subjects transferred 100% and only one
transferred zero. Player B subjects reciprocated with nine out of eleven subjects
returning half (83%). We expect to replicate the data in the three remaining
sequential trust game sessions and have signicantly lower transfer rates in the
sessions employing the simultaneous trust game.
References
[1] Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg, Dynamic Psychological Games,Uni-
versity of Arizona working paper, 2005.
[2] Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg, Guilt in Games,University of Arizona
working paper, 2007.
[3] Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe, "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social
History," Games and Economic Behavior, July 1995, 10(1), 122-42.
[4] Brandts, J. and G. Charness, "Hot and Cold Decisions and Reciprocity in
Experiments with Sequential Games," Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, 3,
2000, 227-238.
[5] Brosig, J., J. Weimann and C.-L. Yang, The Hot Versus Cold E¤ect in a
Simple Bargaining Experiment,Experimental Economics, Vol. 6, 1, 2003,
75-90.
[6] Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg, Promises & Partnership,Economet-
rica, Vol.74(6), 2006, 1579-1601.
[7] Cox, J. C., "How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity," Games and Economic
Behavior, 46, 2004, 260-281.
[8] Cox, J. C., "Implications of Game Triads for Observations of Trust and
Reciprocity," University of Arizona discussion paper, September 1999, re-
vised 2000.
[9] Cox, J. C. and C. A. Deck "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives," Eco-
nomic Inquiry, 2005 43(3), 623-635.
[10] Dufwenberg, M., Marital Investment, Time Consistency & Emotions,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48, 2002, 57-69.
[11] Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy, Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental
Lost Wallet Game.Games and Economic Behavior, 30 (2000), 163-82.
8
[12] Dufwenberg, M., M. Servátka, and R. Vadoviµc, Handshakes,University
of Canterbury working paper, 2007.
[13] Falk, A., E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher, On the Nature of Fair Behavior,
Economic Inquiry, 41(1), 2003, 20-26.
[14] Falk, A. and M. Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control,American Eco-
nomic Review, 2006, 96 (5), 1611-1630.
[15] Fehr, E. and S. Gächter, "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 2000, 159-191.
5 Appendix
5.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
March, 2007
This is an experiment studying decision-making. The instructions are simple
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of
the experiment. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions
with care.
No Talking Allowed
It is prohibited to communicate with other participants during the experi-
ment. Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we
shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
Anonymity
Each person will be randomly matched with another person in the experi-
ment. No one will learn the identity of the person she/he is matched with.
Types
Each two person group will consist of two types of participants (Player A
and Player B) that are assigned randomly. Your assigned type will be listed at
the top of each task instruction sheet.
The Game
You are randomly paired with another individual. One member of your pair
will be a player A and the other one will be player B. Find your type in the
upper right corner of this sheet. You will never be able to nd out the identity
of the player you are paired with.
Each players earnings will be determined according to the process below.
(a) Player A begins the process with $10, and player B begins with $0.
(b) Player A then has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or none
of his/her $10 to player B. Player A circles his or her decision on line (1) of
the attached Decision Sheet. The amount that is not transferred is player As
to keep. The amount that player A transfers triples when it reaches player B.
For example, if A transfers $10 to B, B receives $30. If A transfers $5 to B, B
receives $15. If A transfers $0 to B, B receives $0.
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(c) Player B then has the opportunity to transfer half or none of the money
he/she has received to player A. Player B indicates his/her decision in line (3)
of the Decision Sheet by circling either HALF or ZERO. The amount that is
not transferred is player Bs to keep, and the amount transferred is added to
player As earnings.
5.2 Task 1 Instructions for Player A
In task 2, the initially described two stage game is played sequentially. That is,
player A makes their transfer decision and then player B makes their transfer
decision after being able to see how much player A transferred to them. There-
fore, player B is going to make their decision knowing how much player A has
transferred to them.
For task 1, you must answer the following question:
After seeing how much is transferred to them from player A, what is the
percentage of players B in the room that will return HALF of the amount that
they receive, i.e. HALF of the tripled amount that is transferred to them from
player A counterpart?
Your payout will depend on your accuracy. The payout is calculated as
follows:
You will start with $5. For every percentage point (1 % point) of mistake,
10 cents will be deducted from this $5. The mistake is the absolute value of
(your answer the actual percentage). For example, if you answer accurately,
you will get $5. If you miss by 20% points (i.e., your answer is either twenty
percentage points too high or twenty percentage points too low), you will be
paid $3 (500 - 20 x 10 = 300). If your mistake will be larger than or equal to
50% points, then your earnings from this task will be zero.
I believe that . . . % of players B in the room will return HALF of the tripled
amount.
5.3 Task 1 Instructions for Player B
In task 2, the initially described two stage game is played sequentially. That is,
player A makes their transfer decision and then player B makes their transfer
decision after being able to see how much player A transferred to them. There-
fore, player B is going to make their decision knowing how much player A has
transferred to them.
Type A players in task 1 are asked to answer the following question:
After seeing how much is transferred to them from player A, what is the
percentage of players B in the room that will return HALF of the amount that
they receive, i.e. HALF of the tripled amount that is transferred to them from
player A counterpart?
For task 2, please answer the following question:
What is the average answer of players A in the room to question posed to
them above?
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Your payout will depend on your accuracy. The payout is calculated as
follows:
You will start with $5. For every percentage point (1 % point) of mistake,
10 cents will be deducted from this $5. The mistake is the absolute value of
(your answer the actual percentage). For example, if you answer accurately,
you will get $5. If you miss by 20% points (i.e., your answer is either twenty
percentage points too high or twenty percentage points too low), you will be
paid $3 (500 - 20 x 10 = 300). If your mistake will be larger than or equal to
50% points, then your earnings from this task will be zero.
I believe that the average answer of players A was . . . %.
5.4 Task 2 DECISION SHEET
Player A begins with $10. Player B begins with $0.
Each dollar that Player A gives to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the exper-
imenter.
The decisions of both players will be made sequentially. Therefore, player B
will know how much player A has transferred to player B before player B makes
their decision of whether to return HALF or ZERO.
(1) Player As decision:
Circle the amount that you want to transfer to player B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(2) The experimenter triples the amount.
(3) Player Bs decision:
Circle the amount you want to transfer to player A:
HALF or ZERO
(4) Experimenter calculates total earnings:
Final payo¤ to player A: ___________________
Final payo¤ to player B: ___________________
5.5 Exit Questionnaire
Thank you for participating in the experiment. While we calculate your nal
payout, please complete the following survey. All of your responses will remain
anonymous and only linked to the decisions within the experiment via your
ID#. Therefore, please answer as truthfully and completely as possible. You
will be paid $5 for the completion of this questionnaire.
1. Were you a player A or player B?
2. Did you nd the instructions clear and self-explanatory? If not, please
specify.
3. What was your decision rule when making your choice?
5.6 General Demographic Information
1. What is your age?
2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.)
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01 Male 02 Female
3. Which ethnic group(s) do you belong to? (Circle as many as you need,
then write the country you are from if applicable.)
01 NZ European/Pakeha 04 Asian
02 NZ Maori Country:
03 Pacic Islander 05 Other
Country: Country:
4. What is your major? (Circle one.)
01 Accounting
02 Economics
03 Finance or Information Systems
04 Education
05 Engineering
06 Law
07 Biological Sciences
08 Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences
09 Social Sciences or History
10 Humanities
11 Psychology
12 Other Fields
5. What is your class standing? (Circle one.)
01 Undergraduate rst year 04 Honours
02 Undergraduate second year 05 Masters
03 Undergraduate third year 06 Doctoral
6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? (Circle
one.)
01 Bachelors degree
02 Honours degree
03 Masters degree
04 Doctoral degree
7. What was the highest level of education that your father (or male
guardian) completed? (Circle one.)
01 Less than high school (Fifth Form Certicate or Sixth Form Cer-
ticate)
02 High school (Bursary or UE)
03 Vocational or trade school
04 College or university
8. What was the highest level of education that your mother (or female
guardian) completed? (Circle one.)
01 Less than high school (Fifth Form Certicate or Sixth Form Cer-
ticate)
02 High school (Bursary or UE)
03 Vocational or trade school
04 College or university
9. What is your citizenship status in New Zealand?
01 NZ citizen
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02 Permanent Resident
03 Refuge
04 Other
10. Are you a foreign student on a Student Visa?
01 Yes
02 No
11. Are you currently . . .
01 Single and never married?
02 Married?
03 Separated, divorced or widowed?
12. On a 9-point scale, what is your current GPA if you are doing a
Bachelors degree, or what was it when you did a Bachelors degree? This GPA
should refer to all of your coursework, not just the current year. Please pick
one:
01 Between 7.01 and 9.0 GPA (A- to A+ average)
02 Between 5.01 and 7.0 GPA (B to A- average)
03 Between 3.01 and 5.0 GPA (C+ to B average)
04 Between 1.01 and 3.0 GPA (C- to C+ average)
05 Between 0 and 1.0 GPA (D- to C- average)
06 Have not taken courses for which grades are given
13. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your
spouse and any dependents. Do not include your parents or atmates unless
you claim them as dependents.
14. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of
INCOME earned in 2005 by the people in your household (as household is
dened in question 13). [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips,
interest and dividend payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental
support, social security, alimony, and child support, and others.]
01 $15,000 or under
02 $15,001 - $25,000
03 $25,001 - $35,000
04 $35,001 - $50,000
05 $50,001 - $65,000
06 $65,001 - $80,000
07 $80,001 - $100,000
08 Over $100,000
15. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of
INCOME earned in 2005 by your parents. [Consider all forms of income, in-
cluding salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, social security, alimony,
and child support, and others.]
01 $15,000 or under
02 $15,001 - $25,000
03 $25,001 - $35,000
04 $35,001 - $50,000
05 $50,001 - $65,000
06 $65,001 - $80,000
13
07 $80,001 - $100,000
08 $100,001 - $120,000
09 $120,001 - $140,000
10 Over $140,000
11 Dont know
12 Known only in foreign currency
Write currency and amount here:
16. Do you work part-time, full-time, or neither? (Circle one.)
01 Part-time
02 Full-time
03 Neither
17. Before taxes, what do you get paid? (Fill in only one.)
01 per hour before taxes
02 per week before taxes
03 per month before taxes
04 per year before taxes
18. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one.)
01 No
02 Yes
If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? ...
packs
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